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CHAPTER l
THE HUMAN PERSON IN THE SOCIAL INSTITUTION
The individual today stands over against a rapidly changing society.
Sometimes he has the feeling that he is standing alone or that in some way
he is rapidly getting out beyond his depth.

The prospect alarms him.

Contemplating the sphere of his human autonomy being invaded by the
encroaching organizational structures of the society in which he lives, and
his future being shap1d by cultural determinants over which he seems to have
less and less control, he becomes uneasy and disqui.eted.

Less confident than

formerly in the rapidly expanding limits of his knowledge and the amazingly
ingenious skills of his advancing

te~hnology,

moment to pause and question his human values.

he is more inclined at the
In this way man is becoming

more aware of man; persons, of persons.
This awareness is apparent in many spheres of man's life--in industrial
relations, in personnel management, in community planning, in family life,
and even in international relations.

It was apparent, for example, in the

communications media of the world press after the Czechoslovakian affair of
1968, as it was with particular reference to industrial, commercial, and
academic institutions in France and the U.S.A. at the end of the Summer of
1968.

It was already apparent to a marked degree in the documents.of the

Second Vatican Council.

The basic theme in fact of the first of these

documents, the theme which sets the tone for all the rest, is exactly this:
the Church's responsibility for upholding the importance, the

dignity~

and

the value of the human person ("Lumen Gentium," referred to below as LG, 41).
-1-

-2In view of this new awareness of the dignity of man and particularly in view
of the importance attached to the subject by the documents of Vatican II, this
concept of the human person merits further investigation.

This is the purpose

of ·the study being undertaken.
Before pursuing the investigation, however, it is important, from the
point of view of this study, not to consider the human person alone, but to
place him in the socj.al or institutional context within which he lives.

In

other words, it is important to develop some satisfactory conceptual framework
against which the whole study can be projected.

One such.framework is that

developed by Getzels and Guba at the University of Chicago (Getzels, Lipham,
Campbell, 1968, p. 105).

Based on the broader social theory of Talcott

Parsons at Harvard, this framework serves admirably for placing the human
person in the role he plays within the institution and then projecting that
role against the broader cultural backgrounds of the institution on the one
hand and of the individual on the other.

For the particular purpose of the

study at hand, however, a simpler, more precise framework seems preferable.
This can be developed from.a few brief assumptions on the nature of man
and his need for others.

If it be assumed, first, that the human person is

by nature social, that is, needs to relate to others--parents, wife, family,
colleagues (professional, religious, political, recreational, cultural, and
so .?n); secondly that he needs these for the full development of. his potentialities, for his own fulfillment; and thirdly, as these two assumptions
imply, that the sort of relationship envisaged here is a natural institution,
and not something artificial or man-made; then, on ·the basis of these
assumptions, it can be argued that the role of the organizational or

-3administrative structure of the institutions in which man lives is primarily
,
.
to maintain this right relationship; that is, to maintain it in such a way
that the natural ends of the person and the institution are best achieved.
These three· entities·--the person,· the institution or community (as we
shall tend to call it), and the administration--are thus intimately related
to each other.
From figure 1 it is to be noted (from the double arrows) that there is
a mutual interd_ependence between the person and the community, and that this
relationship is different in character (indicated by the broken lines) from
that which exists between either the person or the community and the
.

-

administration.

From figure 1 it is also apparent that among these three
~

entities there will be raised sooner or later a question of priority;
the person for the community, or vice versa?
the administration?
debatable.

is

Or are both subordinate to

Posed this way, the question would appear to be

The answers given vary from place to place, from institution to

institution, depending on the philosophy or ideology of the institution or
organization concerned.

Ultimately, it is a question of values •.

According

to the Vatican documents, it is the person that enjoys the priority.

"For

the beginning, the subject, and the goal of all social institutions," claims
The Churc~ in the Modern World, "is and must be the human person, which for
its part and by its very nature stands completely in need of the social life"
(i.e., the community) (''Gaudium et Spes," referred to below as GS, 25}.

This

claim does not originate from the document; it is lifed directly from
St. Thomas Aquinas. who in turn lifted it from Aristotle.

The principle, in

other words, goes back at least to the classical age of Greece; the

-4-
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Relationship between person, community .
and administration.

-5significant and, as the document would imply, timely emphasis given it here
belongs very much to the present.
In re--affirming i t today the Church is not initiating something new.

As

the Council says, she is merely "scrutinizing the signs of the times" (GS,4),
recognizing and understanding the world in which we live, "its expectations,
its longings" (GS,4).

In the 1940s Pope Pius XII, with his finger sensitively

on the pulse of society, saw

modern man feeling within himself "a new

awareness of his own personality, of his duties, of his rights" ... and a
"respect for the freedom of others (Christmas Discourse, :1945; Abbott, 1966,
p. 677).

In the years immediately before the Council John XXIII was empha-

sizing the same awareness (cf. "Pacem in Terris," 11 April 1963, AAS 55,
p. 684).

The documents of the Council spell it .out in explicit terms.

"A

sense of the dignity of the human person," says the decree on Religious
f_reedom, "has been imposing itself more deeply on the consciousness of
contemporary man ("Dignitatis Humanae," referred to below as DH, 1).

As

a

result, "modern man," in the words of The Church in the Modern World, finds
himself "on the road to a more thorough development of his own personality,
and to a growing discovery and vindication of his own rights" (GS, 41).
Much of this renewed interest in the dignity of the human person predates the Vatican Council by a good number of years.

A great deal of it is

discernible in the more personalist-oriented philosophers:

Kierkegaard, the

Dane (1813-1855); the Germans, Husserl (1859-1938) (Spiegelberg, 1960) and
Martin Heidegger (1889) (cf. Brock, 1949); and the French, Henri Bergson
(1859-1941) (Lindsay, 1911), Gabriel Marcel (_1889---

) , and Paul Ricoeur; and

especially in the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber (1878-1965). whose_! and

-6Thou, appearing in 1923, and its subsequent elaboration in Between Man and Man
have exerted wide influence in fields outside of philosophy (Friedman, 1960).
The influence of Husserl's though is also discernible in the writings

of

man others--in the philosophers, Max Scheler, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty; and in the existential psychologists, Ludwig Binswanger and
F. Buytendijk.
Significant among American thinkers are the social philosopher Geor&e
Herbert Mean and tho.se whom he influenced at the University of Chicago.
Among the psychologists was Otto Rank, one of Freud's Viennese disciples,.who
settled in America and worked with Jessie Taft at Philadelphia.

Thanks to

Rank and Alfred Adler, another of Freud's early students, the social or
interpersonal dimensions missing in Freud's work were sketched in to the
developing psychology of the person.

Taken further and given a more

practical application in the therapy of Harry Stack Sullivan (cf. Sullivan,

1947), this personalist orientation to therapy and the psychology of the
person comes into its own in the personological writings of Karen Horney
(cf. Horney,

l950}, Erich Fromm 0.964, 1968), and E. H. Erikson; and in the

thinking and practice of contemporaries

l~ke

A. W. Combs (Snygg and Combs,

1959), A.H. Maslow (1954), Sidney Jourard (1958}, and Carl Rogers (1959).
In the fields of administration and personnel management the same
trends are discernible;

The personalist orientation is to be strongly noted

in the thinking of writers like Chris Argyris (1957, 1962), D. McGregor

(1960), Warren G. Bennis (1962), and in the training procedures developed by
the National Training Laboratories (1964).

Simila~

preoccupations 'are

apparent in education--at the administration level in the research papers of

--7-

Andrew Halpin and Don Croft (1963); and at the actual teaching, pupil-care,
and teacher-education levels, in a whole diversity of theorists and
practitioners. (Miles, 1967).
But this new awakening is not entirely extraneous to the Church.

It is

due, according to the Council, to something going on inside the Church as
well, to the "ferment of the Gospel," which, as the documents claim, "continue
to arouse in man's heart the irresistible requirements of his dignity"
(GS, 12, 26, 60).

Whatever the source, the Church's

special task, according

to the document's, is to "open up to man the meaning of hi_s own existence .•.
the innermost truth about himself" (GS, 41); to continue to interpret, "in
t~e

light of the gospel" all;d "in language intelligible to each generation"

(GS, 41), what each generation is discovering.

She does this in numerous

places but nowhere more emphatically than in The Church in the Modern World,
the whole first chapter of which is devoted to "dignity of the human person"
(GS, 12).

CHAPTER 2
THE INTEGRAL PERFECTION OF THE HUMAN PERSON:

.

A BRIEF SURVEY

The preceding chapter dealt with some of the key propositions of the
Vatican Council on the dignity of the human person.

Citations from the

conciliar documents drew attention to the new awareness in society at large
of the significance of the human person.

They also re-iterated the Council's

own emphatic underscoring of the same awareness.

Numerous references to

J

"dignity of the human person" (GS, 12, 41), his "inviolable rights" (DH, 1),
his priority in society (GS, 25), and so on, say a

great~deal

about the

importance of the human person, but they say little about the human person
himself.

When, therefore,

~Church

in the Modern World speaks of the

"integral perfection of the human person" (GS, 59), several pertinent
questions immediately spring to mind.
term "human person" in general?

First, what is to be understood by the

Secondly, in particular and especially for

the purpose of this essay, what is to be understood by his "integral
perfection?"

What composes it?

can be recognized?

What are the signs or attributes by which it

Or the conditions under which it can be attained?

The answers to these questions are difficult to find.

The documents

offer no definition of the human person, neither do they advance
personological theory.

Nor is this a lack.

~ny

Just as the Church has been able

to accommodate itself to diverse philosophies, so it can accommodate itself
to diverse personologies.

On this account it is not necessary, or is it

possible, to go searching the documents for any neatly worked out theory.
is sufficient for our purposes to take up the second of the above questions

It

-9- .
and try to arrive at some idea of the "integral perfection" of the human
person as conceived by the Vatican Council.

In this' chapter, therefore, it

is proposed to make a rapid, somewhat cursory survey of the Council documents
in order to arrive at an

ov~r-all

picture or model (cf. Arnold, in Arnold

and Gasson, 1954, p. 8) of the "integral perfection" of the human person.
outline of the principal characteristics can be sketched in here.

An

Each of

these characteristics can be elaborated in subsequent chapters (see Chapters
.J

3-7).

The first of these is the attribute or characteristic of freedom.

The

documents speak at length about "the human person with his freedom," and
advance the propositions that "only in freedom can man direct himself
•
towards goodness" (GS, 17); only through freedom-can he attain his true
dignity ("Apostolicam Actuosi tat em," re-ferred to below as AA, 8; and also
John XXIII, "Mater et Magistra" in AAS 53 (1961), pp. 440-3).

This freedom,

moreover, extends to each aspect of his life--his "search for truth," his
right to "voice his mind," even to "publicize it" (GS, 59)..
A second dimension of our model is that of responsibility.

Between it

and freedom, there exists a positive linear correlation (DH, 1).
the one is increased, the more the other is incurred (DH, 1).

The more

"Mah has an

inalienable responsibility for his own decisions and actions;" which

.,

responsibility, says an editorial note to the Abbott edition of the Conciliar
documents, is "an essential counterpart of his freedom'' (Abbott, 1966, p. 679).
A third element of the proposed outline, and one which in a sense
follows from the first two, is the competency with·'which a human person
to others·.

A social being by nature, the human person, according to.

relate~

-10~

Church in the Modern World, cannot approach the perfection of his being

unless he has already developed some competence in his interpersonal
relationships (GS, 12).

The interpersonal competence envisaged here, however,

is only an index to, or manifestation of, something far deeper and far more
significant--the disposition to give onself to the service of others (GS, 24).
Almost a result of the human person's greater freedom, sense of
responsibility; and interpersonal skills is his greater human productivity,
J

his greater efficiency in performance (GS, 35).
perfection he has achieved as a "homo

A measure of the degree of

faber," this greater productivity is

in many instances, according to The Church in the Modern World; also an
index of his greater performance as an integral human person (GS, 35) •
•
The fifth and final factor in this model of. the "integral perfection of
the human person" is what has been termed fulfillment.

Given the due

operation of the other four factors, this fulfillment normally follows
automatically.

In the case of the human person, however, it is different

from the satisfaction experienced by the brute.

In the latter, satisfaction

follows automatically; in the former, it also follows automatically but only
upon the proper exercise of the human person's responsibility in the pursuit
of his final goal.

The human person, Pope Paul VI points out in one of his

post-conciliar encyclicals ("Progressio Populorum," referred to below as
PP, 15), "endowed with intelligence and freedom," is "responsible for his
fulfillment as he is for his salvation."

The degree of fulfillment, moreover,

is a sufficiently reliable index to the integrity he has achieved as a
person.
Arranged in tabular form (see Table 1), these five attributes. along

------------------------------------------------.

~-·

-11TABLE 1

.

MODEL OF THE "INTEGRAL PERFECTION OF THE HUMAN PERSON" ACCORDING
TO THE DOCUMENTS OF THE VATICAN COUNCIL II

CHARACTERISTIC

ILLUSTRATIVE REFERENCES

~

Gaudium et Spes 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 24, 29, 41, 59
Apostolicam Actuositatem 8, 12
FREEDOM

Dignitate Humanae 1, 2, 7
Inter Mirifica 8
Unitas Redintegratio 4
Dignitate Humanae

RESPONSIBILITY
INVOLVEMENT
COMMITMENT

RELATIONS WITH
OTHERS
(INTERPERSONAL
COMPETENCE)

1, 2, 8, 14

Perfectae Caritatis 1, 8, 14
Gaudium et Spes

4, 13, 31

Gaudium et Spes

6, 12, 14, 24, 25, 26, 38

Apostolicam Actuositatem 3, 4, 8, 14, 17, 30
Perfectae Caritatis 14
Presbyterorum

Or~inis

3

Optatam Totius 11, 19
Gaudium et Spes 10, 17, 33-39, 64, 84
EFFICIENCY AND
PRODUCTIVITY

Perfectae Caritatis 1, 3, 7, 14
Optatam Totius 11

-.12-

TABLE 1--CONTINUED

CHARACTERISTIC

ILLUSTRATIVE REFERENCES
Lumen Gentium 46
Gaudium et Spes 9, 13, 14, 15, 35, 75

FULFILLMENT

Perfectae Caritatis 13, 18
Paul VI, Encyclical on the Development of Peoples 15
.!

Dignitate Humanae 2

-13with illustrative references set out in the right-hand column, provide a
workable pattern of the human person in the light of the documents of Vactican
II.

Each of these attributes is developed further in the chapters below.
In view of the fact that the council, in putting forward these propos-

itions on the "integral perfection" of the human person, claims to have been
"scrutinizing the signs of the times" (GS, 4), it would be relevant, before
rounding off this

chapter~

to investigate briefly what relationship there is

between these propositions and the views of contemporary social scientists in
this country.
Before launching into a comparative study of this sort, however, it is
necessary to make an important
person and personality.

distinction.~

This is the distinction between

It is to be noted that, whereas the documents speak

generally of the person, some of the scientists in question tend to
personality.

sp~ak

of

Strictly speaking, these two terms, person and personality, are

not interchangeable.

Personality, as Gasson conceives it in Arnold and

Gasson's The Human Person (1954, p. 219), is "the patterned totality of
powers, activities, and habits, uniquely organized by the person;" or as he
points out elsewhere, the "distinctive configuration ••• of activities which is
proper to and characteristic of the individual" (p. 168).
behavior, however, implies an agent who acts.

This pattern of

This agent is the person.

Personality, in other words, is not the person; it is what the person makes
of himself.
(p. 168).

As Gasson summarizes it, personality is "the work of the person"
From this it is clear that the conciliar documents are not talking

generally about personality; they are talking about person.

Neither is their

use of the term "the integral perfection of the human person" referring

-14exactly to the uniquely organized qualities or characteristics that distinguish
one personality from another.

They are referring rather to the basic elements

which constitute the conditions necessary for the proper development of the
person.

Viewed this way, the term personality, as used by the

contempora~y

scientists cited above, refers more to the typical ways in which these
conditions are utilized by the person concerned.
make this clear.

A few illustrations will

David Riesman (1950) writes of the "autono_mous person;"

Abraham Maslow, borrowing from Kurt Goldstein (1939, 1940), speaks of the "self'"
actualizing" person (19 54, p. 199); Carl Rogers, of the "fully-functioning
person".(1959, p. 234); while Paul Goodman speaks of the "independent
_personality" (19651; Erich Fromm, of the "productive personality" (1941); and
Snygg and Combs, of the "adequate personality" (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 237).
As has been shown, these differences in expression represent different ways
of conceiving how the person utilizes the requisite conditions in developing
his peculiar personality.

The extent to which they relate to the conciliar

notion of the "integral perfection" of the human person will be seen from a
comparison with the views set out below.
For this comparison the views of four American psychologists have been
selected.

The first two, Donald Snygg and Arthur Combs, represent the

American phenomenological viewpoint (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 11; Ford and
Urban, 1963, p. 475).

Despite a perceptible shift in thinking between the

first edition of their work in 1949 and the second, revised edition a decade
later, a number of their propositions still remain challengeable.

Their

influence on American psychological thinking, moreover, has been less than
that of the other two.

-15The third psychologist, Abraham Maslow, is one of the

b~tter

known

protagonists of what is known in this country as humanistic psychology (Maslow,
1954, pp. 2-3).
The fourth psychologist selected for this study is Carl Rogers.

Generally

regarded as the founder of client·-centered_ therapy, Rogers sets out his theory
of the "fully functioning" in a number of propositions (Rogers, 1959) based
largely on his experience in therapy.

A number of these propositions,

especially those dealing with his assumptions on the innate regulatory
principle of man's "organismic valuing process" and the resulting "healthy,
integrated" behavior, are widely questioned.

Rogers, qevertheless, has gen-

erated a great deal of research in support of his views (cf. Rogers, 1959);
in additon, he has exerted a great deal of influence generally in the related
fields of personality theory and psychotherapy in this country (Ford and Urban,
1963, p. 4441.
These psychologists have been selected, not because they concur with the
views expressed by the conciliar documents, but because they are representative
of a rather large segment of psychological opinion in this country.

To a

degree the documents, in dealing with the human person, cover the same ground
as the psychologists, but in many instances they go much further.

In some

respects the documents and the psychologists concur; "in others they do not.
These differences will be apparent in the succeeding chapters

and even iri

the brief comparison that follows.
With the introduction, the above sketch of the human person can be
considered item by item.

Beginning with the item of freedom, for instance,

it will be observed that the documents assume free will; some of the

-16psychologists in question (cf. Snygg and Combs, 1949, p. 24 n.) * do not.
The issue here, however, is not whether man has free will but how

mu~h

of

that freedom a person actually enjoys, given his particular personality and
the circumstances in which he finds himself on the instant (cf. Arnold, 1954,
PP· 9, 10).

With this distinction in mind (DH,2) and considering freedom in

the latter sense, it will be noted that where the Vatican II documents speak
of freedom (on, say, the intra-personal level), Maslow would speak of
"autonomy," "detachment," "simplicity" (in the serise of "not easily threatened"), and "resistance to enculturation" (Maslow, 1954, pp. 144-'-5, 224-228).
Snygg and Combs would use words like the "autonomous" person or the person
who takes a "more positive (in the sense of .realistic) view of self" (1959, .
p. 240), and the "non-threatened personalities" (pp. 178-89).

Carl Rogers

is more likely to express himself in words like "being open to one's
experience (in the sense of not resorting to defenses), and "experience being
available to. awareness" (1959, p. 234) in the sense of the person being aware
of the deeper emotions or motivations that might impede or in some way
distort the exercise of his freedom.
The concept of responsibility and the related concepts of involvement
and commitment appearing in the conciliar documents are rendered in a much
~hallower

and almost different way in Snygg and Combs' writings by words

like "identification" (Le., with a cause) (1959, pp. 245, 263, 270); in
Maslow ts 1 by "problem-centering" (i.e., commitment to something outside the
person) (Maslow, 1954, p. 211); in Rogers' works by terms like "balanced

*In the revised edition of their work (1959, p. 17} the authors seem
to have modified their ori inal view.

-17and realistic" (1961, p. 194), "using the self as the locus of evaluation"
(1959, p. 234), accepting the self as a "trustworthy instrument" (1961, p. 195),

and the like.
The concept of interp~rsonal relations, emphasized by the work of Harry
Stack Sullivan (1953), is well understood by American psychologists in
general.

For this concept Snygg and Combs use terms like "acceptance of others'

(1959, p. 137) and "compassion," Maslow uses similar terms--"acceptance of

self and others" (1954, p. 206), "democratic structure" (p. 219),.
"Gemeinschaftsgefuhl" (p. 217), and simply ninterpersonal relations" (p. 218).
For the same concept Rogers uses terms like living ''with others in maximum
harmony" (Rogers, 1959, p. 235).

In the

Vat~can

II concept, of course,

there are other, theological, connotations leading to considerations of
'

.

Christian charity which are beyond

the scope of this essay.

The notion of greater efficiency and productivity Maslow would see
partly as a consequence of better "discrimination" between "means and ends"
(1954, p. 220), a "more efficient perception of reality" (p. 257), or simply

being "cognitively" efficient (p. 204}.

Rogers would conceive it as "each

situation" being met "with a unique and creative adaptation" (Rog_ers, 1959,
p. 235), while Snygg and Combs would employ the straightforward expression,
behaving "more effectively and efficiently" (Snygg and Combs, 1959, P• 250),
referring thereby to the effectiveness of the work performed as well as to
the efficiency of the performer.
The last factor, fulfillment, is conceived by the psychologists as a
sense of well-being or satisfaction, appropriatness or rightness of fit
which pervades the organism when its response has been the natural, appropriat«

,,..

I

....- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ , , . _ . _ ._ _,_.,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. , _ , _ ._ _.._.__......,..,,,,__.....,.....,,,.........._,....,...,_...,.._ _

-18response and tension is at a minimum.

To describe this condition Syngg and

combs as well as Maslow use the term "spontaneity" (Snygg and Combs,
1959,
',
P· 252).

Rogers is expressing the same phenomenon when he talks of the

"self-structure" as being "congruent with experience" but would go further
~

and describe the person living at this level as experiencing a "more
sensitive living, with greater range, greater variety, greater richness"
(Rogers, 1961, p. 189).

Maslow speaks in much the same way but extends this
_.;-

dimension to include the rarer but tremendously more fulfilling experiences
that he calls "peak" or "mystic experiences" (Maslow, 1954, p. 216).
the

Where

conciliar concept goes beyond this will be seen i~ Chapter 7.
Summarizing this psychologists' picturG of the human person and

comparing it with that of the Vatican documents, we get a composite picture
like that set out in Table 2.

Along the horizontal axis are the character-

istics of the human person as envisaged by the Vatican documents; along the
vertical axis, the corresponding characteristics as described by the four
psychologists considered above.

~

._,,,,,,
TABLE 2
MODEL OF THE "INTEGRAL PERFECTION" OF THE HUMAN PERSON ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENTS OF
VATICAN II AND THE WRITINGS OF FOUR CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGISTS
DOCUMENTS OF
VATICAN II
CONTEMPORAR'
PSYCHOLOGISTS

FREEDOM

RESPONSIBILITY
INVOLVEMENT
COMMITMENT

INTERPERSONAL
COMPETENCE

"Identification"
(i.e., with a
cause)

"Compassion .••
Concern for .
Others"

EFFICIENCY
AND
PRODUCTIVITY

FULFILLMENT

~

"Autonomous
"THE ADEQUATE
PERSONALITY"
(SNYGG

&

COMBS)

''Non-threatened
Personalities"

11

"Behaves More
Effectively
and
Efficiently"

Spon taneous
and Creative
Behavior"

"Less Compulsion to
• Prove Oneself"

-"Positive View
·Of Self"

"Acceptance of
Others"

"THE SELFACTUALIZING
PERSON"
(ABRAHAM MASLOW)

"Simplicity
Not Easily
Threatened"
"Resistance to
Enculturation"

"ProblemCen tering"

"Gemeinschafts-,"More Effigefuhl"
cient
Perception
"Acceptance of
of Reality"
Self and
"Cognitively
Others"
Efficient
''More Data
Available

"Freshness
of Association"

I

"Full
I Stature"
"Mystic
Experiences 1
I·

.I

I

......

\0

I

.,,,.

TABLE 2--CONTINUED

FREEDOM

"THE FULLYFUNCTIONING
PERSON"
(CARL ROGERS)

"Open to
Experiences"
(No Defenses)·
"Symbolizations
Accurate"

RESPONSIBILITY
INVOLVEMENT
COMMITMENT
"Balanced and
Realistic"

EFFICIENCY
INTERPERSONAL
COMPETENCE

AND

PRODUCTIVITY

"With Others in "Each SituaMaximum Harmony'' tion Met with
a Unique 4nd
Less Need for
Creative
Adaptation"
"Defensive \
Behavior"

FULFILLMENT
"SelfStructure
Congruent
with
Experiencen
"More Sensitive .••
Greater
Variety ••.
Greater
Richness" ·

/
I

N

0
I
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CHAPTER 3
FREEDOM

Focusing on the concept of freedom, this chapter will deal with the
elements of this concept as they are developed in the documents of Vatican
Council II, and, with the corresponding elements as they are developed in
the four selected psychologists.

Within these two parts it will make the

further distinction between "freedom from" (items 1-7, Table 3) and "freedom
to or for" (items 8-11, Table 3).

In dealing with the former there will be

a distinction between the factors.that constrain

a person

from without

(items 1-4, Table 3) and those that inhibit him from within (items 5-7,
Table 3).

Of some of these inhibiting forces man is aware; of others he is

largely unaware.
As was shown in Chapter 1, the conciliar documents base many of their
propositions on the "integral perfection of the human person" (GS, 59) on
man's freedom.

A more detailed study of this notion of freedom reveals a

distinction between what the documents call "freedom from" and "freedom to:"
freedom from those things that constrain or inhibit the exercise of one's
freedom (cf. GS, 27, 31), and freedom to do those things that afford one
opportunities for self-realization and fulfillment (cf. GS, 17, 31, 62);
Gasson in Arnold and Gasson, 1954, p. 194).

The concept of "freedom from"

is further distinguished into freedom from the inhibiting factors that
restrict the person from within (cf. GS, 12, 60); and the constraining
factors that constrict him from without (cf. "Inter Mirifica," referred to
below as IM, 2, 8; DH, 7, 8; GS, 27).
The latter are listed in some detail.

Speaking broadly,

~

Church in

the Modern World asserts that "whatever violates the integrity of the human

___.,

f•,,.
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TABLE 3
TABLE 3--CONTINUED
FREEDOM--SUMMARIZING THE VATICAN DOCUMENTS AND
THE CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS

VATICAN DOCUMENTS

SNYGG AND COMBS

2.
3.

4.

Social, economic, racial,
religious discrimination.
Public opinion, political
pressumes. IM 8.
Encroachment of state.
DH 1.
Cultural determinations.
DH 7.

l;~~

"Higher degree of independence of
social and physical forces"
"Break loose from many of the petty
tyrannies of their surroundings"
"Less need to defend themselves from
external attack"
"Break with tradition and orthodoxy"

CONSTRAINTS FROM WITHIN:

5.
6.

7.

Socio-psychological factors.
IM 8, DH 2.
Emotional imbalance.
GS 10.
Prejudices, anxieties,
obsessions, guilt. GS 12,
16, 20, 41, AP ACT 12.

"No great need to defend themselves
against experience"
"Cope with life openly and directly
with a minimum of threat and fear"
"Non-threatened personalities"

FREEDOM TO/FOR:

8.
9.
10.

11.

Towards his own goodness.
GS 17.
Spontaneous choice of the
good. GS 17.
Motivated from within.
GS 17.
Freedom in social, personal
and spiritual affairs. UR 4.

CARL ROGERS

,;~

CONSTRAINTS FROM WITHOUT:
1.

ABRAHAM MASLOW

fl.'!
>Jelative independence of physical and
~cial environment"
'.Jlore easily "resist enculturation and
··• intain a certain inner detachment
om the culture in which they are
ersed.

simplicity that is not easily
reatened"
.."i/ery unneurotic way of reacting
yes see what is before them without
... ing strained ••. to distort or shape
colour the reality"
··;Live
more
in the real world ••. than in
·.,-..
.
e manmade mass of concepts, abstract. ns, expectations, beliefs and stereo-·
i·. pes that most people confuse with
real world"

I"

Less "vulnerable •.. threatened ...
anxious"
"Open to his experiences ... exhibitin
no defensiveness"
"Distorting nothing, denying nothing
•.. all experiences open to awareness"

"Positive view of self"
"Respond more to the inner wellsprings
of understanding and motivation"

the fresh, concrete, and
the generic, abstract,

Fewer "conditions of worth"
More "unconditional self regard"

·,

-24person ... attempts to coerce the will itself" (GS, 27), and then goes on to
spell out some of the more specific factors it has in mind.

Among these

"infamies" (GS, 26), as it labels them, are included "every ••• type of
discrimination, social or cultural, whether based on sex, race; colour, social
condition, or religion" (GS, 29)--on what The Church in the Modern World
calls "the fundamental," or The Declaration on Religious Freedom "the
inviolable" (DH, 1), "rights of the human person" (GS, 29).
Particularizing on some of these constraints, the latter document cites
society in general as a constraining factor upon the use of man's freedom •
. "Many pressures," it declares, "are brought to bear upon men of today,
to the point where the danger arises lest they lose the possibility of
acting on their own judgment" (DH, 8).

The De.c::tee. of Communication draws

attention to the fact that through contemporary instruments of communication
"public opinion exerts massive force and authority over the private and
public life of every class of citizen" (IM, 8).

One sphere of life where

this massive force of public opinion is significant is the political sphere.
The Church in the Modern World singles this ·sphere out as one where what
it calls the "national procedures" should allow the "largest possible number
of citizens to participate in public affairs with genuine freedom" (GS, 31).
This brings up questions like the abuse of authority.

Beginning with

admonitions against what they term "the encroachments of the State" (DH, 1)
and other forms of civil government, the documents deal successively with
similar abuses in ecclesiastical, religious and even family institutions.

~'

Priests, in dealing with the laity, are urged "scrupulously •.• (to) honour
....t_h_a_t__J_·u_s_t__f_r__e_e_d_o_m__w_h_i_c_h__i_s__d_u_e___t_o__e_v_e_r_y_o_n_e__i_n__t_h_1_·_s__e_a_r_t_h_1_y__c_i_t_y_'_'_______________.
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(Presbyterorum Ordinis, II referred to below as PO, 9); while religious
superiors are exhorted to govern in a way that will cultivate in their
religious "that enlarged freedom which belongs to the sons of Gotl" ("Perfectae
Caritatis," referred to below as PC, 14).
freedom

The same safeguards of personal

are advocated in the exercise of domestic authority within the

family (cf. "Apostolicam Actuositatem," referred to below as AA, 11, 12) and,
indeed, in all other spheres where men relate to one another, whether it be
on an industrial, commercial, recreational, or more general social basis.
These relations, declares the decree on the laity, "should not be stained by
any quest for personal advantage or by any thirst for dominations" (AA, 8).
Looking to other likely factors which might impose constraints upon man
in the legitimate use of his freedom, The Church in the Modern World draws
attention to the harmful effects of great poverty.

"Human freedom," it

claims, "is often crippled when a man falls into extreme poverty, just as it
withers when he indulges in too many of life's comforts" (GS, 31).

The

Declaration on Religious Freedom sees the possibility of further harmful
constraints in the culturally determined patterns of our society--prevailing
fashions, modes of recreation, entertainment, patterns of family life, sexual
behavior, and the like.

"The usages of society," says the document, referring

to such factors, "are to be the usages of freedom in their full range.

These

require that the freedom of man be respected as far as possible, and curtailed
only when and in so far as necessary" (DH, 7).
Determining the limits of this necessity is a matter of extreme
importance.

In fact, this whole question of the "freedom and dignity" of

the person is one which comes up in almost every document.

It is, to sum up

-26-

in the words of the decree on the laity, a matter "of the utmost delicacy"
(M, 8).

Leaving this enumeration of external factors which constrain

t~e

freedom

of the human person from without, we can pass on to a consideration of the
factors operating from within.

These are the factors that inhibit the use

of what the documents describe as man's "psychological freedom" (DH, 2).
Emphasis on the external or coercive limitations on the exercise of freedom
has been marked in Roman documents especially since the time of Leo XIII.
Only in recent years, however, has much recognition been given to the factors
influencing man from within.

Pius XII's

referenc~,

for instance, to the man

who "feels .within himself a consciousnes.s oLhis own personality" draws
attention to these more strictly intra-personal forces in man which in some
instances drastically curtail his freedom.
The older moral theology, it is true, contained the classical treatise
"on the obstacles (impedimenta) to freedom," but as a model to cope with
the more recent findings of the behavioral sciences it is somewhat inadequate.
It assumes that man enjoys a perfectly autononous power of decision which is.
hindered only occasionally, accidentally, and exceptionally by certain
disturbing factors which operate from within man and largely beyond his
control (Monden, 1965, pp. 34-40).

Quite. different is the picture presented

by contemporary psychology, sociology, and anthropology.

Here the dialectic

of freedom and determinism is seen, not merely as accidental, but as ·
essential to almost every human act.
particularly the biological:

Some of the determining factors,

the opiates, the tranqui1izers, the psychedelics

the "police drugs," the truth serums, and the more recent discoveries of neuro

-27surgery and endocrinology are well known and from time to time thrust
themselves dramatically before the public eye.

Less well known are the more

strictly social and psychological factors.
These need further consideration.

Many men, it is claimed, are prevented

from acting with any great degree of real autonomy.

To a large extent they

are mass products, strongly influenced by what the document on communication,
quoted above, described as the "massive force and authority" of the prevailing
opinions and propaganda canvassed by the new instruments of communication
(IM, 1).

More and more, it seems, they tend to react as a mass,.judge as a

mass, and feel as a mass, without any adequate defense against th, powerful
·socio-psychological pressures operating within and around them (IM, 8).' Many

.

women, for instance, have not been able to resist the strong influence of
these socio-psychological pressures on questions like that of birth control,
nor for that matter have juries sitting on this and related matters.
Pressures like these, declares the same document, seem "all too easily"
able to "trigger" forces which remain in man "wounded as he is by original
sin" (IM, 7) and "split within himself" (GS, 13).
Equally powerful in curtailing man's freedom has been his emctional
imbalance (GS, 10) or what The Church in the Modern World describes as the
lack of "harmony with himself, with others, and with all created things"
(GS, 13).

The deep need, at times scarcely emerging into consciousness,

for security, love, esteem and other affective relationships on the one
hand, and the half-recognized aggressiveness, hostility, and competitiveness
on the other hand; and, above all, what the documents term the nagging
doubts and uncertainties (GS, 12) about oneself--all these have a decided

-28inhibitin~

influence on man's attitudes and actions.

Of such

forces man is

most of the time all too painfully aware.

In this respect the documents

see him as captive (GS, 17).
More painfully inhibiting still, however, are those forces of which he
is less clearly aware.

They remain deep within his own psyche.

Functioning

at more unconscious levels, these forces, renmants largely of his past, can
bind him more strongly than the others.

Fixated in his mind as a host of

unassimilated and, to that extent~ paralyzing deformations, these are the
lurking anxieties (GS, 12), ·the blinding ignorances and prejudices (GS, 16,
60), the tyrannical automatizations, bondages, and obsessive impulses
(GS, 41), the debilitating frustrations, uneasy feelings of guilt and other
equally intimidating fears (GS, 12), which time and time again intrude into
what should be free, mature, adult decisions, reducing them repeatedly to
I
the level of the immature, the blase,
or even the infantile (GS, 4, 60; AA,

12; cf. Monden, 24-6).
From this condition the human person has to be constantly rescued.
Only in so far as he is liberated from tyrannies like these is he capable of
enjoying the freedom to which his personhood entitles him.

For that reason,

it seems, the conciliar documents are as much concerned with the question of
"freedom from" as they are with the more .positive question of "freedom to"
or "freedom for."

Only when man is freed from the things that bind him is

he free to "direct himself towards goodness" (GS, 17).
to this new question of "freedom for."
and how will man use it?

Let us pass on then

In what precisely does it consist

Will he use it "perversely," asks The Church in the

Modern World, after the fashion of certain contemporaries?

Or "as a license
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for doing whatever pleases him, even if it is evil" (GS, 17)?

This would

hardly be the "authentic freedom" which the documents see as an exceptional
sign of the divine image within man" (GS, 17).
optimistic.

The conciliar Fathers are more

Left "in the hand of his own counsel," they say, quoting Sirach

(15 :14), man "can seek his own Creator spontaneously" (GS, 17).

But the

freedom to choose, which is herein implied, must be present as a condition.
Human dignity, say the Fathers, "demands that (man) act according to a
knowing and fre~ choice."

And this choice, it·is emphatically pointed out,

"is personally motivated and prompted from within.

It does not result from

blind internal impulses nor mere external pressure" (GS, 17).
This spontaneity which, according to the documents, characterizes the
~

"freed" man's behavior will be taken up again subsequently in the chapter on
fulfillment (cf. Chapter 7).

'-

For the moment it is important to return to

the question of how man uses this freedom.
The documents conceive this use in terms of means and ends.

Liberated

from the constraints and limitations that once bound him, man now "pursues
his goal," according to The Church in the Modern World, "in a spontaneous
choice of what is good, and procures for himself, through effective and
skilful action, apt means and end" (GS, 17}.
The means are diverse.

First, rilan is to use his freedom, not as an

escape from the demands of society, but as a means rather of integrating
with and better adjusting to it.

"Freedom," says one of the documents,

"acquires new strength ••. when a man consents to the unavoidable requirements
of social life" (GS, 31).

Secondly, man is to enjoy freedom of inquiry,

thought, and expression.

"Within the limits of morality, and the general

-30welfare," says The Church in the Modern World, "man is free to search for
truth, voice his mind, and publicize it" (GS, 59r.

In a later paragraph the·

document affirms this same freedom to the scholar in the Church.
recognized that all the

f~ithful,

"Let it be

clerical and lay, possess a lawful freedom

of inquiry and of thought, and the freedom to express their minds humbly
and courageously about those matters in which they enjoy competence" (GS,
62).

Thirdly, man's freedom extends even into the realms of spirituality,

liturgical worship, and theological

speculatio~.

"While preserving unity in

essentials," says the document on ecumenism, "let all the members of the
Church, according to the office entrusted to each, preserve a proper freedom
·in the various forms of spiritual life and discipline, in the variety of
liturgical rites, and even in theological elaborations of revealed truth"
("Unitatis Redintegratio," referred to below as UR, 4).
Daring in its liberality, as it may appear to some, this third point
goes no further than the pre-conciliar reconnnendations of Pope John XXIII
and Cardinal Bea.

It merely spells out some of

implicit in the principles already laid down.

t~e

more specific applications

Though mainly theological in

their orientation or point of view, these principles find corroboration in
the more psychologically oriented principles of the contemporary ·American.·
psychologists to whom reference has already been made and to whose works it
might be relevant at this moment to turn.
Taking first the writings of Snygg and Combs, it may be useful to
recall their earlier position (1949, p. 24n.1 on free will (supra,
Chapter 2)..

Although this. positi.on has been subsequently modified (1959,

p. 17), the gap between tfJ.eir basic assumptions and those of the Vatican

-31documents is still obvious.

Even so, several relevant parallels are to

be noted.
The first is the question of freedom from constraints which come from
outside the person.

On this the authors assert that "adequate" personalities,

as they describe those acting at this level, feel in no way deprived, and on
that account have "far less need to defend themselves from external attack"
(Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 243).

Neither do they have "great need to defend

themselves agait).st their experience" (p. 243). , As a result they are seen as
being able to "break loose from many of the petty tyrannies of their surroundings," thereby achieving a certain "autonomy" which, the authors claim,
appears to be a "direct outgrowth of the
and trust in self" (p. 254).
diverse ways.

indi~vidual'

s openness to experience

This sort of freedom manifests itself in

It is observed, for example, in the "higher degree of

independence of social and physical forces which," according to Snygg and
Combs, "bind many of the rest of us" (p. 254).

It is observed also in the

basic security and courage which enable people who enjoy greater liberty to
"break with" what the documents (e.g., PC, 3) term the outmoded customs and
regulations that over the years have come to be taken for tradition or
orthodoxy (cf. Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 253).
With reference more particularly to freedom from within, the same
people are viewed as seeing themselves in "essentially positive ways.n
this way they are "free and open to their experience."

In

Such people apparently

feel "strong and safe enough to cope with life openly and directly with a
minimum of threat and fear" (p. 239).

They view the world in which they

live as exciting and challenging, yet well within their own capacities to

-32...;
deal with.

On that account, claim the authors, they might almost equally

well be described as "nonthreatened personalities" (p. 240).
Freed thus from the things that threaten them and finding themselves
less in the grip of extern.al events and things beyond their control, these
people seem able to "respond more" to what Snygg and Combs would describe as
"the inner wellsprings of understanding and motivation" (p. 254; cf.
promptings of Holy Spirit, LG, 15; GS, 92; "Optatam Totius," referred to
below as OT, 3)..
Maslow's concept of freedom in the "self-actualizing" person is almost
parallel.

Referring to constraints upon the person from without, Maslow

shows how the person enjoying this sort of

~reedom

maintains his freedom

even when dealing with or acting as an authority figure.
paradigm he uses is the teacher-student relationship.
he maintains, behave in a "very unneurotic 1! way."

The specific

Teachers of this type,

Instead of viewing the

classroom situation as a "clash of wills, or authority, of dignity, etc."
they view it as a "pleasant collaboration" (Maslow, 1954, p. 231).
win-lose" model just does not apply.

The

In this way, Maslow claims, "the

artificial dignity that is easily threatened" is replaced by "the natural
simplicity that is not easily threatened."
Similarly in regard to freedom from the demands of the environment,
culture and society at large:

a characteristic of people enjoying this sort

of freedom, Maslow claims, is their "relative independence of the physical
and social environment" (p. 213}_.

The same holds true in regard to the

somewhat more interiorized cultural patterns:

·'

these people, observes Maslow,

more easily "resist enculturation and maintain a certain inner detachment

-31from the culture in which they are immersed" (p. 224).
Freer from environmental and cultural determinations on the outside,
these people are also freer on the inside.
greater reliability of thefr perception.

Maslow observes this in the
The limiting or distorting effects

of "wish, desire, and prejudice,"" he avers, are very much less marked in the
person who has achieved this sort of freedom (p. 205).

In the samples he

investigated self-actualizing people distinguished "far more easily than
most the fresh, concrete, and idiographic from.the generic, abstract, and
rubricized."

As

a result they live "more in the real world of nature than

in the man-made mass of concepts, abstractions, expectations, beliefs and
stereotypes that most people confuse with the real world" (p. 205).

The

same reality factor distinguishes the character£stic way they experience
guilt.

Unlike those psychologists who would regard all guilt as pathological,

Maslow does not claim that in his subjects there is an "absolute" absence
of guilt--of shame, sadness, anxiety,

defensiveness-~but

merely an absence

of what he calls "unnecessary (because unrealistic) guilt."

The animal

processes of sex, urination, pregnancy, menstruation, growing old, and
the like, are seen, he claims, as "part of reality and so must be accepted."
No healthy woman then need feel constrained in her freedom or inhibited
through having to feel guilt about
processes" (p. 208)_.

'~eing

female or about any of the female

As a consequence many of the so-called problems of

conscience and morals are seen not to be problems at all:

they are unreal

ones and exist only in the minds of the narrow, rigid, unfree persons -who
~---

create them; when seen di ff erently--and more real is tically--~!\Jd:ilsapp~a.r
(p. 230).

:"

l

\

'

""-... \ .
~

\
l

{

\.

I

-34This concept of freedom is presented in similar terms in the Rogerian
description of the "fully-functioning" person.

The person who is not

functioning fully is the one who is not yet sufficiently free and as a
'

consequence, according to Rogers,. "denies to awareness or distorts in
awareness significant experiences" (Rogers, 1959, p. 204).

Such a person

is said to be "vulnerable" or "threatened" or "anxious," according to the
point of view from which he is considered--from the outside or from his
own inside point of view.

The well adjusted person, on the other hand, the

person enjoying proper freedom, will be--to use Rogerian terms--"open to his
experiences," exhibiting "no defensiveness," distorting nothing, denying
nothing; and, as a consequence, making "all experiences available to
awareness" (p. 2341.
A person who has attained this degree of freedom, Rogers claims, will be
less susceptible to the influence of his environment, less dependent upon
the judgment of others.
evaluation" (p. 2341.

Instead he will "experience himself as the law of
In thi.s way, as he tends to become more immune to

the approval or disapproval of others, to impose upon himself, in Rogerian
language, fewer "conditions of worth" (p. 235), and to function

~nstead

from

an interior motivation or experience more "unconditional self-regard."
It is clear that the psychologists in question have addressed themselves
mainly to the intrapersonal factors limiting freedom.
reasons.

This is so for several

With the exception of Maslow there is a tendency to

data drawn largely from pathological cases.

general~ze

from

In some instances, too, the human

person seems to have been credited with few degrees of freedom above the
rest of the organic world (cf.· Gasson, 1954, p. 167); or, as Arnold says, it

-35is too readily assumed that what the human person does is de~ermined by his
"temperament, upbringing, environment, and cultural milieu."

Given that this

is true in part, it is also true, Arnold adds, that the person has "aims and
purposes" that rise aoove this, that "he thinks, that he can make deductions,
can reason" and, as a consequence, "can decide for or against any given
action" (Arnold, 1954, p. 9}.

On these accounts it is not surprising to find

in the psychologists' treatment of freedom certain limitations not found in
the conciliar tTeatment.

These limitations not withstanding, the

ogists' treatment is relevant.

psychol-
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RESPONSIBILlTY~-A

BALANCED VIEW

An immediate consequence of the freedom advocated for man in the

preceding chapter is his responsibility.
inasmuch as he is free.

A person can be responsible only

Between freedom and responsibility, in other words,

there is a direct proportion.

This can be expressed in many ways:

a person

can be responsible only inasmuch as he is free; or, increase a person's
freedom and you thereby increase his responsibility.
and is coterminous with the other.

The one follows from

"Man," says an editoral note in the

Abbott editon of the documents of Vatican II, "has an inalienable responsibil..ity for his own decisions and actions which'i.s the essential counterpart
of his freedom" (Abbott, p. 679 n.}.

This doct.rine is not new, hut appears,

from the increasing numbers of references to it in recent papal writings-of Pius XI (cf. "Mit Brennender Sorge, 11 19371, -for example, Pius XII and
John XXIIl (cf. "Pacem in Terris, 11 19631-.,.to have assumed an altogether
new significance.

That significance would seem to be on the order of a new

phenomenological awareness of what it means to be a person.

The Declaration

on Religious Freedom catches this a little when it speaks of this sort of
responsibility as being associated with the dignity of personhood.
endowed with reason and free will, 11 it claims,
personal responsibility" (Dil, 2}.

11

"Beings

are privileged to bear

In other words, as this document sees lt,

responsibility follows from the fact of freedom.
The argument is much the same as it was in presenting the case for
freedom.

In dealing with the human person's right to freedom the documents

begin by considering first the constraints that hamper man in the exercise

-37of his freedom and then pass on to the more positive aspect of what man's
freedom is for and what the exercise of it is to being him.

Similarly in

dealing with the human person's responsibility, the documents begin by
considering the obstacles to the exercise of responsibility and then go on
to consider what this exericse means to man.
The "demand is increasingly made," says the Declaration on Religious
Freedomm that men should make full use of their
acting On "their

OWU

"responsib~e

freedom,"

judgment, II and being motivated from Within and

driven by coercion" (DH, 1).

nOt

11

The Church in the Modern World and·particularly

the post-conciliar documents (cf. Paul VI's Progress of the Peoples, 1967,
n. 9) draw attention to the fact that some are "deprived of the opportunity
to exercise responsibility;" others cannot exercise it because they are
"culturally poor" (GS, 57}.

For that reason the conciliar document claims

that for the discharge of their responsibilities with "greater exactness"
people must be "carefully educated to a higher degree."

For this purpose,

argues the document, · 11 innnense resources are available."
"Children and young people," it is !!!tressed, ''have a right to be
encouraged" to make "personal choices" (GS, 17} in order thereby to
\

experienc~

a sense of responsibility.

Educators are urged to "form men •••

who will come to decisions with their own judgment and ••• govern their
activities with a sense of responsibility" (DH, 8}.
A part of this general sense of responsibility is the more specific
sense of one's responsibility to

~thers

and the consequent needs for

'~fulfilling one's duties in community life" and "joining with others in

I
co-operative. effort" (DH, 81.

.
The Decree on the Renewal

Ef.

the.

Religio~s
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Life makes a big thing of this responsibility in religious.
all have contributions to make."

"They (religious)

"Some exercise a ministry of service,"

says the decree, quoting St. Paul to the Romans (12 : 5-8) and to the
Corinthians (I Car. 12

4}; "some teach doctrine, some encourage through

exhortation, some give in simplicity, or bring cheerfulness to the sorrowful"
(PC, 8)_.

But all have a responsibility and all should be afforded the

opportunity to exercise it by being listened to ''willingly" and "encouraged
to make a personal contribution" (PC, 14).
Associated with this notion of responsibility are the related
phenomena of involvement and commitment.
religious with such a strong sense of

The decree on Renewal would see

respon~ibility

that they become

completely involved, "spending themselves incre~singly for Christ" (Le.,
for His corporate body, the Church--cf Col. 1 : 241, and going all the way
to sacrifice "through a surrender involving their entire lives" (PC, 1).

In

this way not only does the individual religious grow in authentic adult
commitment, but the Church, the congregation to which he belongs also stand
to benefit (GS, 64; cf. Monden, 28}.
This sort of responsibility, this sort of commitment, can also benefit
society at large.
existence (GS, 41.

It can reveal to other men a meaning for their own
Religious, when discharging their responsibility and

displaying the degree of commitment envisaged here, are viewed by the docu.,...
ments as the witnesses needed in the world today--responsible enough, committe<
enough, strong enough "to provide coming generations with reasons for living
"--

and hoping."

In that sense the "future of humanity" is seen as lying in

their hands (GS, 31)_.

-39The view expressed above in the conciliar documents--that the responsibility exercised by the human person is directly proportional to the freedom
he enjoys--is also shared by the psychologists being considered in this essay.
Snygg and Combs,
held views.

revi~wing

this question, draw attention to two widely

The first and earlier view is that man is completely responsible,

entirely and independently of anything outside of him.
the opposite:
victim of his

The second view is

that man is not responsible but that he is completely the
e~vironment

(Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 309), almost a physical

object whose behavior is <let.ermined by forces acting upon him.

Between these

two extremes Snygg and Combs, in their later work (1959, p. 310; cf. 1954,
p. 24 n. and Chapter 2 above}, choose the middle position. In this respect
they approach the position taken by the Vatican-documents, namely, that the
human person is neither so completely responsible as the first view suggests
nor so inevitably and irrevocably at the mercy of his environment or the
forces within him as the second view claims he is.
controlling and in part controlled (p. 310).

They see man as in part

The more effectively he can

be set free from the forces that encroach upon the exercise of his freedom,
the more completely he can assume the responsibility that goes with his
integrity as a person.
The view held by Rogers is little different.

The human person, "when

functioning freely," is "constructive and trustworthy" or, in the terminology
used in other parts of this chapter, responsible.

After a quarter of a

century of experience in psychotherapy Rogers comes to what he calls an
"inescapable" conclusion, namely, that "when we are aole to free the individua
from defensiveness, so that he is open to the wide range of his own needs, as

-40well as the wide range of environmental and social demands, his reactions
must be trusted to be positive, forward-moving, constructive" (Rogers, 1961, ·
p. 194).

The position Rogers is assuming here, as Arnold* points out, is a

form of angelism.

Whether Rogers is aware of this implication in his state-

ment is not clear from the contex·t.

What is clear is that, although he

expects the human person to approach this level of freedom and responsibility,
he does not expect him to attain it completely.
Rogers is not particularly concerned about how the person is taught :to
be responsible.

There is no need, he claims, to be overly concerned about

how man will relate to others, for one of his deepest needs is "for
affiliation and communication with others:" as the person becomes more fully
himself he will more easily and naturally relate.

Neither is there need

to be overly concerned about how he will control his aggression:

as he

becomes open to all his impulses, his need to receive and express affection
will be as strong as his need to "strike out and seize for himself" (Rogers,
1961, p. 194).

In other words, as

the person advances to the position of

"being open to all. his experiences," he will become more responsible.

His

behavior, as Rogers says, will be more 'thalanced and realistic."
For th.e widely held view that man is not responsible and that he is
basically irrational Rogers has little sympathy.

The human person ts

behaviour, he would maintain, is "exquisitely rational" (Rogers, 1961, p •. 195}
The tragedy for most is that their "defenses" keep them from being aware of

*In a note to the wri.ter.

-41the fact:

consciously they are moving in one direction, organismically they

are moving in another.

Decrease the number of these defenses, Rogers argues;

and you increase a person's participation in what he calls the "rationality
of his organism."

The nec,essary control of impulses, he believes, would be

found in the "natural and internal balancing o,f one need against another"
(Rogers, 1961).

Participating this way in what Rogers calls the ''.vastly

complex self-regulatory activities of his organism" (1961, p. 195), the
human person achieves a greater yet easier balance.

He is freer, in other

words, to be more responsible.
From the evidence provided in this chapter it would appear that
·responsibility as conceived by the psychologists is different from the

-

fuller concept expressed hy the Vatican documents.

Seen by the latter as a

consequence or concomitant of the fact that the person has a purpose in life
which he is free to pursue, responsibility is viewed as both a duty and a
privilege; it is not reduced> as it may appear in Rogers, to a balanced
response to organismic needs; or, in Snygg and Combs, to a successful
adjustment to environmental conditions (cf. Arnold in Arnold and Gasson, 1954,
p. 9).

In the conciliar concept of "responsible freedom" there are several

important implications which have to be spelled out.

The first is the

necessity of providing opportunities for the personal exercise of responsibil-,
ity (item 2, Table 4); the second, the contribution this exercise of
responsibility can make to the life of the community at large (item 3, Table
4}; and third, the witness and significance of this exercise of responsibility
for those seeking a meaning in life (item 4, Table 41.
Allowing for these differences between the conciliar understanding of

TABLE 4
RESPONSIBILITY--SUMMARIZING VATICAN DOCUMENTS AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS

VATICAN DOCUMENTS

1.

"Balanced and realistic"
"Exquisitely rational"
"Rationality of his organism"

"Set free .... in order to
assume responsibility"

"Reactions must be trusted to
be positive, forward-moving,
constructive"

RESPONSIBILITY FOR OTHERS:
-"Fulfilling one's duties in
conununity life" DH 8
-"Personal contribution"
PC 14 DH

4.

"Part controlled ••• part
- controlling"

OPPORTUNITY FOR RESPONSIBILITY:
-"Opportunity to exercise
responsibility" GS 18
-"Personal choices" GS 18
-·"Govern actions with a sense of
responsibility" DH 8

3.

CARL ROGERS

PRIVILEGE TO EXERCISE RESPONSIBILITY
-"Inalienable responsibility for own
decisions and actions (Abbot)
-"Privilege to bear personal
· ( responsibility" DH 2
-"Responsible freedom" DH 1

2.

SNYGG AND COMBS

MEANING FOR . EX~STENCE, FOR
"LIVING ,AND HOPING" GS 4, 13

''Need for affiliation and
communication with others"

: I
.;i:..

N

I

-43responsibility and that of the psychologists, the latter nevertheless make
interesting observations.

Syngg and Combs, as has been shown, depart from

their earlier views and take a position leading towards that of the documents.
Rogers, as indicated, approaches a certain angelism.

His view of the person

participating in the "rationality of his organism" even recalls the view
of St. Thomas Aquinas, where man's organism, through his internal senses,
participates in his rationality.
reverse:

The difference is that Roger has it in

for him, it is the organism that is rational, and not the person!

..

(

-44CHAPTER 5
COMPETENCE IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

A third characteristic of the integral perfection of the human person is
relatedness to others or what may be more appropriately termed competence in
interpersonal relations.
already treated.

In a sense this is a consequence of the two elements

The significance of this characteristic for the proper

functioning of the human person can be demonstrated from both theoretical and
practical considerations.
Taking with the documents call "enlarged freedom" (item 1, Table 5) as
a basis, this chapter will deal successively.with the ways in which greater
competence in interpersonal relationships makes possible a greater development of human resources (item 2, Table 5), assures greater personal awareness
of others (item 3, Table 5), and la;s the foundation for the growth of
I

friendship and love among men (item 4, Table 5}.

In view of the present

trends towards greater socialization in society this growth in

friendsh~p

and

love among men is assuming more and more importance in the world today (item
5, Table 5).

For this reason the chapter will draw attention to the emphasis

the documents place on the need for cultivating more adequate interpersonal
relations among men (item 5, Table 5}.
Theoretically, it could be argued that the less need a person has for
defenses, the less crippled he is by feelings of worthlessness, the less
restricted he is by repressions and inhibitions of his own making (cf. GS,
12, 13) and by the physical, social'and economic limitations
imposed by his
,
environment (GS, 27, 63; PP, 9), the freer he is to experience and cultivate
those emotions which facilitate adequate relations with others.

These

-:: • <
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TABLE 5
INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCE--SUMMARIZING VATICAN
DOCUMENTS AND CONTE}fPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS

VATICAN DOCUMENTS
PC 14

1.

"ENLARGED FREEDOM"
AS BASIS

2.

DEVELOPING HUMAN RESOURCES:
-Making available "resources of
their minds and wills" PC 14
-Man, a social being, needs
others to "live and develop
own potential" GS 12

3.

SNYGG AND COMBS
"Less feelings of guilt and failure"
"Does not deny or distort feelings"
"Less compulsion to prove oneself"

CARL ROGERS .

cept themselves at all levels"
·lative lack of overriding guilt, of
ippling shame, and of any extreme of
vere anxiety"

Less need for "defensive distortion of
perception"
"Exhibiting defensive behavior"

. ep feeling of identification"

Need of "unconditional positive
regard from significative others"

"Dependent on good will and cooperation of others"

INCREASING PERSONAL AWARENESS:
-"Socialization ... personalization" GS 12
-"Truly personal relationships"
GS 6
-"Increasing sense of solidarity"

ABRAHAM MASLOW

me ins chaf ts gefuhl"
"Living effectively with others"
"Living efficiently with others"

AA 14

4.

FOUNDATION FOR GROWTH OF
FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE:
-"Helping one another through
friendship" AA 17
-"Sign of love" AA 30
-"Finding self through sincere
gift of self" GS 24

5.

CULTIVATION OF INTERPERSONAL
SKILLS AND QUALITIES AA 14;
GS 6, 12

of ..• sympathy and

"An open accepting relationship with
the world about him"
"Characteristic corrern for his fellows"
"To appreciate, accept and love"
"Actualization of those with whom one
is identified" ••. "Give of themselves"

fusion, greater love, and
perfect identification"

Living with others in "maximum
possible harmony"

-47emotions, "variations of human love," as Arnold calls them, are considered
absolutely essential to the growth of those relationships without which it
is very difficult for the human person to develop properly (Arnold, 1963, II,
p. 312).

'

It is within this context, it seems, that the documents speak of ,

the necessity of helping men and women (religious especially) achieve in
their interpersonal relations that sense of "enlarged freedom" which
releases, as it were, or makes available for themselves and others all the
"resources of their minds and wills •.• their gifts of nature and of grace"
(PC, 14).

With the foundations for sound interpersonal relations thus laid, the
documents go on to establish other practical"reasons for developing
competence in this area.
The first is the need men have of one another for the full development
of their capacities.

"By his innermost nature," argues The Church in the

Modern World, "man is a social being, and unless he relates himself to others
he can neither live nor develop his own potential" (GS, 12).

The second

is the need arising from the developing pattern of social life.
document is arguing for the same interpersonal competency,

Here the

basin~

its

argument this time on the fact of the increasing socialization of human
life throughout history and what it terms the increasing "personalization"
of organizational relationships.

"A man's ties with his fellows," runs the

argument, "are constantly being multiplied," a reali.ty of contemporary life
which the present day trend towards "socialization" is making more obvious.
Given this trend, the document concludes, and the "further ties" it develops
between men, the promotion of what it calls "appropriate personal

developm~nt

-

-48and truly personal relationships" becomes imperative (GS, 6):

The same

argument is resumed in the document on the laity where the emphasis is placed,
not directly on interpersonal relationships themselves but rather on the
virtues thought to underly them--"honesty, justice, sincerity, kindness, and
courage" (AA, 4}_.
A third reason arises from the nature of the true Christian life.

The

lay people in the Church are urged to observe "among the signs of the time
the irresistibly increasing _sense of solidarity among all peoples" and
therefore to

"co~operate

just" (AA, 14}.
ship."

with all men ••• to promote whatever is true and

Especially are they to "help one another through friend-

In this way, says the document on the laity, they will "gain strength

to overcome the disadvantages of an increasingly isolated life and activity
and to make their apostolate more productive" (AA, 17}.

Even children,

argues the document, must be educated "to transcend the family circle ••• to
open their minds" and to go out warmly and confidently to others (AA, 30).
This, concludes the document, is the very sign by which Christians are
known, "the· sign of love" (AA, 8}.
A fourth reason is the nature of the basis dyadic human relationship
found in marriage.

It is not for nothing, especially in view of what

has been said above in the three preceding paragraphs, that the documents
begin to conceive marriage. fundamentally as an interpersonal communion.
The relationship, or rather the "companionship" of the two married partners,
provides in the mind of The Church in the Modern-World, the model of "the
primary form of interpersonal connnunion" (GS, 12}_.

The mutual surrender

of one person to the other in this sort of union becomes the prototype, so

-49to speak, for the sort of relationship that completes man.

The human person,

who, according to the documents, is "the only creature on earth which God
willed for itself cannot," it seems, "fully find himself except through
a sincere gift of self" (GS, 24).
For these reasons the documents lay heavy stress on the cultivation of
competence in interpersonal relations, not only in lay people (AA, 14; GS, 6)
and partners in marriage particularly (GS, 12, 48), but also in those living
in a celibate community as religious (PC, 14, 18) and especially in the
clergy.

The latter are urged to acquire those virtues which are, as

t~e

doc-

ument on priests says, "deservedly esteemed in human affairs •.• goodness of
heart, sincerity, strength, and constancy
justice, civility," and the like (PO, 3).

of~character,

zealous pursuit of

But the acquisition of these

virtues is not to be left to chance; it is to be initiated in the seminary,
where the proper interpersonal dimension is to be emphasized right from the
start.

What is required, says the document on the formation of the clergy,

are "the abilities most appropriate for the promotion of dialogue with men •••
a capacity to listen to other people and to open their hearts in a spirit
of charity to the various circumstances of human need" (OT,

l~,

1.9).

Passing now, as has been done in the preceding chapters, to a comparison
between the conciliar image of the human person along this dimension of
interpersonal relations and the image presented by our representative four
contemporary psychologists, significant parallels are to be noted.
Beginning with Snygg and Combs concept, it is to be noted that a certain
degree of interpersonal competence is not only characteristic

of the

"adequate" personality but also necessary for normal functioning of any

-soperson.

"We are so entirely dependent upon the goodwill and co-operation of

others," claim these psychologists, "that it would be impossible to achieve
feelings of adequacy without some effective relationship with them (Snygg
and Combs, 1959, p. 246).

As a consequence a man, quite plainly, "must b!=

capable of living effectively and efficiently with his fellows" (p. 246).
Living "effectively" with others implies the possession of the normal skills,
the "know how," so to speak, of relating to other people.
with others, however, implies much more.

Living "efficiently'

It implies not only the skills

but also the dispositions that enable the possessor of them to relate in .
such a way that his experience of these interpersonal relationships and
acceptance of others is enriching and rewarding both for himself and others •

..

This sort of acceptance of others generally presupposes a wholesome
self-image and acceptance of self as pre-requisites.

Characteristically,

according to Snygg and Combs, the self-accepting person "accepts praise or
criticism objectively," "does not deny or distort feelings, motives, or
abilities in self," "sees self as a person of worth on an equal plane with
others," "does not expect others to reject him," "does not regard self as
queer or abnormal," "is not shy or self-conscious," and so on (p. 257).
The self-acceptant person acts this way, it seems, because he ha's "less
feelings of guilt and failure."

This freedom from pathological guilt, as

Snygg and Combs seem to be conceiving it,· apparently "releases the individual,'
and places him under "less compulsion to prove himself at the expense of
others."

This makes possible for the individual what the authors would

describe as "an open accepting relationship with the world about him" (ibid.,
p. 258.

Cf. Scheler, 1923, as quoted in Arnold, 1963, II; p. 312).

-51The one seems to follow from the other.

Syngg and Combs are of the

opinion that, "when one is strongly identified with others what he does to
actualize self is likely to contribute also tothe actualization of those
with whom he is identified-" (p. 257).

With less pressing need, as we have

indicated above, to demonstrate his adequacy or to thrust himself forward in
areas where he feels deprived, he is free to take on this "characteristic
concern for his fellows" (p. 258), to "accept, appreciate and love" them
(p. 257).

Such· a person, as these psychologists describe him, "does not

hate, reject, or pass judgment on others" when they differ from him; he "does
not attempt to dominate," nor "assume responsibility for others."

He "does

not deny the worth or equality of others;" in tact, in his "active interest
in others" he demonstrates a "desire to serve" them and to create "mutually
satisfactory relationships."

Should he seem to be advancing self--and at time:

he may seem to be by some.--he is "careful not to infringe the rights of
others."

Not only do such persons find it unnecessary and even repulsive

to use others for solely personal gratification, they actually devote
themselves to others in such a way that they can be said literally to "give
of themselves'' (p. 257).
Maslow argues the same way.

He sees this concern for others as a

characteristic of the interpersonal relat·ionships not only of his selfactualizing persons, but also as an important element in the life of any
person.

He sees it as sterruning largely from a basic acceptance of se1.f.

Self--actualizers, he claims, "accept themselves at all levels--love, safety,
belongingness, honour, self-respect" (Maslow, 1954, p. 207)_.

They can do

this, he believes, because they can take what he calls "the frailties and sin,

r
-52weaknesses and evils of human nature" in the same unquestioning spirit with
which they accept nature itself.

They accept nature "as it is, and not as

they would prefer it to be" (p. 207).

Many of these qualities--self-

acceptance, feeling of security, sense of belongingness, and the like,
which may seem at first sight to be largely unconnected, tend to·be regarded
by Maslow as they were also by Snygg and Combs, as deriving from a more
basic condition, namely, a relative absence of pathological guilt, of a
sense of worthlessness, and of "extreme or severe anxiety" (p. 219).

It is

the basically deprived man, the anxious man that considers the world a
dangerous place, a "jungle," as Maslow would put it, "an enemy territory

..

populated by (l} those whom he can dominate and (2) those who can dominate
him" (p. 232) •
Persons functioning more normally see the world differently.
have, in Maslowian terms, "a deep feeling of

id~ntification,

They

sympathy, and

affection" Q1aslow, p. 217} in spite of the occasional hostility, anger, or
disgust which, as Maslow explains, quoting Erich Fromm, is not characterbased but more likely reactive or situational (p. 219).

To catch more

precisely the particular flavour of these feelings for mankind that Maslow
finds in his self-actualizers he uses the word Gemeinschaftsgef~hl, invented
for the purpose by Alfred Adler (p. 217).

These people, Maslow claims, have

"deeper and more profound interpersonal relations" than others.

On that

account they are capable of "more fusion, greater love, and more perfect
identification" with others, together with a greater sense of mutual
enrichment, than many people would consider possible (p. 219).
Rogers, though considerably briefer and more technical (1959, pp. 234-

-5340) in his treatment of this characteristic of interpersonal.relationships,
proceeds in much the same way.

Because his "fully-functioning" person

enjoys a better self-image he has less need for what is described as a
"defensive distortion of perception" and less need therefore of "exhibiting
defensive behavior" (p. 237); consequently he will be more open to others.
In this way he stands to experience the "unconditional positive regard from
significant others" which, according to Rogers, is a characteristic condition
of his growth and development as a person (p. 234).

But, saysRogers, because

this positive regard is "reciprocal" and tremendously rewarding,.this person
will "live with others in the maximum possible harmony" (p. 235).
It is clear that the documents of Vatican II are pointing out
implications for interpersonal relations that go far beyond those envisaged
by the psychologists.

Restricting their study more to the obstacles impeding

healthy interpersonal relationships, some of them, Snygg and Combs
particularly, tend to concentrate on questions of anxiety and guilt.

This,

coupled with the tendency to regard all guilt as pathological, tends to put
them in conflict

(~f.

Arnold, 1954, p. 515; 1960, II, pp. 291-297; 302-6)

with the position taken by the documents (cf. GS, 28), and indeed with. the
other psychologists, particularly Maslow (1954, p. 2071:

-54CHAPTER 6
PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY
A fourth characteristic of the human person which the conciliar
documents seem to stress is that of man the producer--the productive person.
This is a picture of the person who can cope with life, whose manner of acting
is positive and constructive, who enjoys a certain measure of self-confidence,
entertains positive feelings about himself, accepts himself, is uncomplicated
and straightforward in his handling of situations; whose whole response ·to
life, in short, can be best described by words like efficiency, productivity,
or even creativity.

Some of these characteristics could bear lengthier

elaboration.

•

Concentrating on the dimension of productivity and efficiency, this
chapter will attempt to compare the way this characteristic of the human
person is presented in the Vatican documents with the way it is presented in
theffilected group of psychologists.

Noting first that, when man is

(
functioning efficiently and productively, he not only copes better with life
but also becomes himself more effective in the process (item 1, Table 6), it
will then consider the question of how this comes about.

It will show in turn

that in this condition the person, being less defensive and more open to
reality (item 2a, Table 6}, becomes a

mor~

reliable instrument (item 2b,

Table 6); that, because he is more open and more reliable'as an instrument,
he has more access to data and is therefore likely to come up with better
solutions to his problems (item 3, Table 6); and that, as a result, he is
generally more straightforward and uncomplicated (item 4, Table 6) in his
general response to life.
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EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY--SUMMARIZING VATICAN
DOCUMENTS AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS

VATICAN DOCUMENTS
1.

SNYGG AND COMBS

ABRAHAM MASLOW

MORE EFFICIENT AND PRODUCTIVE
-Productive GS 35
-Copes effectively GS 10, 33-39,

CARL ROGERS

redictions of future ..• more correct"
"Behaves more effectively and
efficiently"

84
(

. 2.

MORE DATA AVAILABLE:
-Less defensive GS 17

"Open to all experiences
"More data available"
"Capable of seeing relationships not
seen by others"
"Behaves from choice rather than
from necessity"

-Efficient instrument OT 11

"No great necessity for self-defense
and less neeed to distort or select
perceptions"
"Trust in himself and his own capacities and perceptions"
"Feelings, attitudes, etc., effective
and efficient guides to behavior"
"Self as an on-going sensitive;
trustworthy instrument"

3.

BETTER SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS
OT 11

4.

STRAIGHTFORWARD, UNCOMPLICATED
WAY OF ACTING OT 11

arger horizon, wider breadth of vision,
·. iving in widest frame of reference"
erceptions less based upon wish, desire,
·,,'ear, or upon generalized character, ,'.;. etermined optimism"

.· ognitively efficient"

),

'{

"More open to experience"
"Accurate symbolization in
awareness"

"Self as locus of evaluation"
"Organismic valuing a trusthworthy
guide to most satisfying
behavior"

"Unique and creative Adaptation
to the newness of that moment"

"Wider,· less complicated, more
precise and accurate perception
of events"

-57The question of productivity can be considered first.

The notion

conveyed here by the documents is that of the person who is productive, not
in the sense of producing things but in the sense of improving himself.
"When a man works," says The Church in the Modern World, "he not only alters
things and society, he develops himself as well" (GS, 35).

In the thought

of the document, the person enjoys priority over the things he produces, be
these things material things, "technical advantages" or even more spiritual
things like the "more humane ordering of social relationships."

"A man is

more precious," cliams the document "for what he is than for what he has"
(GS, 35).

What he has accumulated is by no means insignificant, but what is

more significant is the fact that in the process of accumulation man also,
as the document concludes, "learns much .•• cultivates his resources •. goes
outside and beyond himself."
In going "outside and beyond himself" man escapes from the prison of
his own self and is left free to cope more effectively with the situation
around him.
World says~

But this is not always easy for, as The Church in the Modern
1

'the imbalances under which the modern world labours are linked

with that more basic imbalance rooted in the heart of man" (GS, 10).

11

In

man himself," the document continues, "many elements wrestle with one
another;" on that account he "experiences .•. limitations in a multitude of

ways~'

yet at the same time he is ''boundless in his desiresn to tackle the problems
beyond himself.

This, in fact, is one of the main preoccupations of the

document--to dispel the many false conceptions of the Christian attitude
towards involvement (GS, 33-39).
u~on

Man is not expected to remain turned in

himself, but to accept himself and his limitations and then to get out
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and go beyond himself, to learn to cope with the problems of the day (GS, 10),
whether they be the pressing needs of establishing deeper international
understanding and co-operation on the one hand (GS, 83-90) or the less
spectacular but equally

pr~ssing

needs of providing "food, supplies,

health, education, and labour" on the other (GS, 84).
This apparently is what the Council means by seeking for solutions which
it describes as "fully human" (GS, 40).

By thus imbuing the "everyday

activity of.men with a deeper meaning and importance" the Council sees
every undertaking as a means, not merely of overcoming a difficuity but also,
and especially, of bringing man to his full stature as a human person, of
"making the family of man and its history," as the document puts it, more
•
human." This, the Council believes, is to be one of its greatest contributioni
-·-its "healing and elevating impact on the dignity of the person" (GS, 40).
A third note in this concept of the productive man is the increased
capacity he enjoys for studying the problems confronting him.

Given that

he has been liberated from the things that put constraints upon his freedom;
given also that he enjoys a greater sense of responsibility and that he is
less defensive in his relations with others; given all these things, then
it might be expected that he would be more capable of making
appraisal of the data before him.

an

objective

When a man has been emancipated from "all

captivity to passion," as the documents have it, the means he chooses wil1:be more "apt," his action will be more "effective and skilful," and the goal
he proposes will be pursued with a more "spontaneous choice" (GS, 17) ~·

All

of which implies, according to the document on the formation of the clergy,
a "degree of human maturity ... a certain emotional stability ..• (and) an ability
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acceptant view of oneself, and a readiness to rely on oneself as a reliable
and efficient instrument; in short, "a solid maturity of personality" (OT, 11).
Related notes are the· originality of the productive man, his greater
energy, and relatively simple, straightforward way of acting (OT, 11).

Freed

from the things that bind him from within, man now finds himself directing his
energies to things outside him, to improving the environmental conditions undet
which he lives and particularly those under which he works.

He demands

greater participation in the conduct of the institutions which.touch his
life; a greater share in the administration and profits of the enterprises
in which he earns his bread (GS, 68); then he begins to direct his attention
to improving the socio-politico-juridical order of the country in which he
lives (GS, 93).

Finally he turns himself to the world at large, attempting,

by his labour and knowledge, to bring the whole of it "under his control"
(GS, 53, 63).

Man, in other words, attempts to make his history rather than passively
have it happen to him.

But what the documents are saying here about man in

his history and in his culture generally (GS, 53-72) can be said about any
man in particular.

Free him so that he can act more from choice than from

necessity, develop his facility for relating with others, make him more aware
of his responsibility, and he will discover for himself a way of acting which
will not only make him more effective and productive but also leave him with
a feeling of what it is to perform efficiently.
Turning from the conciliar documents to the writings of our four
psychologists we find the same' theme of the human person as the efficient,

MU
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productive and creative agent extensively elaborated by cont~mporary
psychology.
On

the dimension of efficiency the ''adequate personality" rates very high.

This personality, claim Snygg and Combs, ''behaves more effectively and more
efficiently than his less adequate fellows (Snygg artd Combs, 1959, p. 246).
The reason given is that, freer in himself, he is "open to all experience."
Being under "no great necessity for self-defense, he has less need," explain
these writers, "to distort his perceptions or to select them in terms of his
peculiar unfulfilled goals or desires."

Thus equipped, he is freer to

devote "much greater time and attention to wider fields of experience" (p. 252),
to examine things that are perhaps intimida1:ing or unpleasant to others, and
so cope better with life and its demands (p. 239}.

Such a person, claims

the authors, is "capable of seeing relationships not seen by others" and,
as a result is less likely to "confuse means and ends" (p. 253}.

With this

wider and more reliable perspective on which to base a response, he is able
to behave more "from choice than from necessity" (p. 250).
The gains from this are considerable.

The greater reliability in

perception and the resulting effectiveness in behavior are likely to produce
in the individual over a suitable period of time an increased "trust in himself
and his own capacities and perceptions" (p. 254).

Gradually, according to

Snygg and Combs, he discovers that "his feelings, attitudes, beliefs and

-

understandings are more often than not effective and efficient guides to
behaving" (p. 255).

In this way and with the appreciation and approval of

those who note and admire his more effective behavior, he learns to accept
himself as a more reliable instrument. an "on-1wing. sensitive •. trustworthy.

-61process" (p. 255)_.

The accumulation of these positive perceptions about

himself enable him to build up such a reservoir of positive feelings which,
say the psychologists, can serve as a shock-absorber or security base against
which the "damaging experiences" of one's day-to..,.day existence can be
reflected (p. 242}.
Besides coming to accept himself as a more trusthworthy and spontaneous
instrument, the person who is functioning well will come up with solutions
to life's problems that are at once "more adequate, creative and original"
(p. 253}.

This is a consequence, it seems, of what Snygg and Combs see as

the person's capacity to "penetrate more directly and sharply to the heart
of problems" (p. 251}.

Since his perception of reality is apparently ''wider,

less complicated, more precise and accurate," his response to life and life's
situations is likewise more straightforward and uncomplicated (p. 254).
This straightforward, uncomplicated relationship to life in turn makes
possible an even "greater awareness, a·quicker perception, and a more
accurate judgment of all aspects of experience, including self" (p. 255).
/

All of which gives this person an enormous advantage in dealing with life.
Virtually the same conclusion is reached by Maslow in discussing the
efficiency dimension of his self-actualizing person.
roughly the same:

His argument is also

because of this person's greater openness to wider and

better data, he is more likely to come up with better solutions to his
problems.

Beginning at the perceptual behavior of this sort of person,

Maslow argues that his "predictions of the future from whatever facts were
in hand at the time seemed to be more of ten correct because less based upon
wish, desire, anxiety, fear, or upon generalized character-determined
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optimism" (p. 204).

'

Citing the English psychoanalyst, Money.-Kyrle, he argues .'.

that it is possible to call the neurotic person not only "relatively but
absolutely inefficient" simply because he fails to perceive reality as
accurately or efficiently'as the healthy person.

The neurotic, Maslow

concludes, is "not only emotionally sick, he is cognitively wrong" (p. 204).
Pushing his discussion to the higher cognitive levels of behavior,
Maslow advances two further arguments.

In one place he argues that "a priori

considerations encourage the hypothesis that this superiority in the
perception of reality eventuates in a superior ability to reason, to perceive
the truth, to come to conclusions, to be logical, and to be cognitively
efficient in general" (p. 205).

In another place he argues that "the

impression of being above small things, of having a larger horizon, a wider
breadth of vision, of living in the widest frame of reference, sub specie
aeternitatis, is of the utmost social and interpersonal importance" (p. 212).
Rogers has little to say on the question of efficiency.

His

understanding of efficiency in the fully functioning person is similar to
that of Snygg and Combs and Maslow.

Not only are his conclusions similar

but his premises are also much the same.

The fully functioning person is

efficient because, being more open to his experience,.he has greater access
to available data--"the social demands, his own complex and possibly
conflicting needs, his memories of similar situations, and his perception of
the uniqueness of this situation."

All this data, Rogers admits, 'would be

very complex indeed," were it not that the person __ could permit ''his total
organism (sense impressions •.. previous learnings ••• visceral and iriternal states
and so on), his consciousness participating, to consider each stimulus, need,
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•

weighing and balancing, discover that course of action which would come
closest to satisfying all his needs in the situation" (Rogers, 1961, p. 190).
The defects which, according to Rogers, render this process sometimes
untrustworthy are the inclusion of information which is irrelevant to the
situation at hand, or the exclusion of information which is relevant.

It

is when "memories and previous learnings" are fed into the judging process
as "if they were this reality," and not just memories and learnings; or, as
Rogers continues, when certain "threatening experiences are inhibited from
awareness," and hence withheld from the judging

proces~

or fed into it in

distorted form, that the wrong responses are forthcoming.

If, on the other

hand, people can remain open to all their experiences and trust their own
reactions, they stand to be surprised at the appropriateness of their own
behavioral responses.

They will come to meet each new situation with a

response which Rogers would describe as "a unique and creative adaptation
to the newness of that moment" (1959, p. 235).

-
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FULFILLMENT
This chapter deals with the last of the characteristics of the human
person as described by the' Vatican documents--fulfillment.

They focus on

the nature of this experience, describing it as a certain joy or

satisfac·t~

(item 1, Table 7), a certain feeling of dignity and worth (item 2, Table
or a certain openness to change and fullness of personality (item 3, Table
This experience is seen as natural and is expressed in spontaneous behavior
(item 4, Table

71.

It seems clear that these psychologists often miss the

implications of the Vatican II documents that fulfillment is the result of
productive and effective living.

Instead, •they describe the subjective

feelings that indicate mental health or self-actualization and that make
it possible to live productive and fulfilled lives.

Thus it is possible that

feelings arising from a "living out" of one's drives (cf. Arnold, 1954, p. 7),
unrestrained and without reference to one's objective final goal, may be
mistaken for fulfillment.

Likewise spontaneity (cf. Snygg and Combs, 195J,

I

p. 252) is sometimes taken to indicate fulfillment (cf. Gasson, p. 167}.

l

neither of these concepts concurs fully with the wider implications of the

I

But

I

documents.
On the supposition that a man can be· freed from most of the things that
impede the exercise of his freedom; that he has acquired a proper sense of
responsibility; that his relations with others are mutually sustaining,
stimulating, edifying; that he is more efficient, more productive and so
achieve more; on the supposition that these conditions are present,_ the
documents then seem to say that the person is more satisfied, more joyful,
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TABLE 7
:.

FULFILLMENT--SUMMARIZING VATICAN DOCUMENTS
·i

;t

AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS

VATICAN DOCUMENTS
1.

j

SNYGG AND COMBS

JOY, SATISFACTION, FULFILLMENT
GS 9, 13, 14, 35, 75

Ji.~

~.:1l;,,

~

..

ABRAHAM MASLOW

CARL ROGERS

"Capacity to appreciate freshly and
naively"
FaCility for "enjoying life"
"Fulfilling themselves"

"Enriching, exciting, challenging,
meaningful"

.'I

r'·

!
I

l
2.

,; I

FEELING OF DIGNITY AND WORTH
GS 15, 33

I :r

"Problem centered vs. ego centered"

"Dignity and worth ••. self-actualizat{on. ::
1 './

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-+~~~~~~~~~~--'~~--rl,:

3.

OPENNESS AND FULL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY GS 9,
PC 18, LG 46
"Rich self .•. can afford to be
gent"

.

"Developing to their full stature"
"Potentialities and latent resources"
"A superior awareness of own subjective reactions"
"Pleasant and ecstatic"

·"Process •. vs. static condition"
"Wider range of! •• increasing openness
•
, II
to •.. experience
"More sensitive .•• greater variety •..
greater richness"
"Maximum adaptability"
"Flowing, changing organization of
self-personality"

"Philosophic acceptance of the nature
of his self''

"It feels right"

"

f

II
l

!
4.

SPONTANEOUS--"IMPELLED BY
NATURE" DH 2
"Spontaneous and creative behavior"

5.

OWN RESPONSIBILITY
(Encyclical on the Development of Peoples)

'

-67experiences a greater self-worth; in short, is fulfilled (GS, 9, 13, 35, 75).
Fulfillment and joy in the sense of mere blissfulness or contentment do
not quite catch the meaning implied in the documents.
something stronger, something enriching, rewarding.

What is intended is
Joy or fulfillment, in

the sense intended here, is more like the feeling that accompanies the best
exercise of one's capacities (GS, 15).

With this experience comes the

feeling that one can cope adequately with his environment and successfully
meet the challenge that life confronts him with.

From this experience

there develops also a certain confidence in oneself:

a trust in one's

capacities, a reliance in the validity of one's feelings, and a sureness and
sense of appropriateness in the time and manner of expressing them.

In

short, he begins to experience himself as a significant, competent, trustworthy, acceptable and lovable person (GS, 14).

All of which gives rise, not

only to a feeling of integrity, well-being and worthwhileness in himself

(GS, 26), but also to sustaining and fruitful relations with his fellows
(GS, 25}.
This sort of fulfillment is something which all men seek.
for it is universal.

The desire

It is discernible too at all levels, whether it be in

man himself, say, in an achievement like learning to walk; in his technology,
say, in learning to fly; or in his bi;-oader socio-political life.

On the

latter level, for example, it is recently and even dramatically apparent in
the undeveloped yet emerging countries of the world.· "Persons and societies,"
says The Church in the Modern World , "thirst for a full and free life
worthy of man" (GS, 9); and this is true for the lower, uneducated classes.
"Laborers and farmers (in these undeveloped countries) seek not only to
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provide for the necessities of life but to develop (also) the gifts of their
personality by their labors" or by what the same document calis elsewhere
"culture-.,.the cultivation of natural goods and values" (GS, 53).
This cultivation of the gifts of personality and the achievement thereby
of "an authentic and full humanity" are held up as a goal for all people
(GS, 53}.

Religious are urged to seek it "earnestly" in all places or aspects

of their development--"spiritual, doctrinal, and professional" (PC, 18).
The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church asserts, for example, that "the
profession of the evangelical counsels, though entailing renunciation of
certain values which undoubtedly merit high esteem, does not detract from a
genuine development of human perfection (LG, 46).

Likewise the document on

the renewal of the religious life asserts that it is not enough that celibate
religious "only be warned of the dangers confronting chastity;" they should
also be "trained to make a celibate life consecrated to God part of the
richness of their whole personality" (PC, 12}.

The same goal of fulfillment

is seen in all other aspects of man's life--in his marriage (GS, 52), in
his cultural life (GS, 60}, in his socio-economic life (GS, 63-72), in his
political life (GS, 73-76), and above all in himself, with the reminder of the
impossibility of this "fulfillment apart from God" (GS, 13).
All this is urged upon man because it is natural.

This seeking for

enrichment and fulfillment represents a legitimate longing of the human
heart.

Man is "impelled" to seek it "by nature" and also by the internalized

values and standards of his own society.

By the very fact of its being

natural, however, man is also bound to it, as the document on religious
freedom points out, by a "moral obligation'' (PH, 18).

Paradoxical though it

r
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may seem to speak of an obligation to fulfillment, the documents insist.
Because sin has, in their view, "diminished man" thereby "blo~king his
path to fulfillment" (GS, 13), it is necessary that from time to time he be
reminded of it.

Even civil authority can help--"by bringing about

conditions,~

as The Church in the Modern World says, "more likely to help citizens and
groups freely to attain to complete human fulfillment with greater effect"
(GS, 75).

In the last analysis, however, and notwithstanding the nudgings of

civil authorities or the reminders of the Church man is ultimately responsible
for his own fulfillment.

"Endowed with intelligence and freedom, he (every

man)," says Paul VI in an encyclical statement quoted above (Chapter 2, i),
"is responsible for his fulfillment as he is for his salvation.

He is aided,

or sometimes impeded, by those who educate him and those with whom he lives,
but each one remains, whatever be the influences affecting him, the principal
agent of his own success or_ failure."

It is up to the individual himself.

"By the unaided effort of his own intelligence and his will," concludes the
encyclical, "each man can grow in humanity, can enhance his personal worth,
can become more a person" (PP, 151.
The above excerpt from Paul VI's encyclical goes further than our
contemporary psychologists on this question of fulfillment.

Where the

documents are objective, the psychologists tend to concentrate on subjective
experience.

While, for instance, the conciliar term "fulfillment" is the

result of effective and efficient living, in view of man's objective final
goal, for Snygg and Combs it would imply something more subjective--"personal
feelings of dignity and integrity, feelings of worth and self-actualization."
People who experience these feelings, according to these authors, are thought
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to live more integrally complete lives.
In the first place, Snygg and Combs point out, these people seem to be
able to "utilize themselves and their experience as the basic frame of
reference for much of their behavior" (p. 254).
behavior is much freer and more spontaneous.

In the second place, their

Growing out of the same basic

characteristics--respect for their own dignity and integrity--is a greater
capacity for what the psychologists call "spontaneous creative behavior"
(p. 252).

With less need to be defensive, these people who enjoy a greater

fulfillment do not have to "maintain rigid and narrow lines of operation. 1 '
Whereas the "poor self must shelter and protect his investments with

.

scrupulous care and conservatism," the "rich. self" by contrast "can afford
to be extravagant."

Such is the inner strength..and security of these

people that they could, according to Snygg and Combs, even "risk themselves
in experimentation" (p. 253)_.
Maslow also cites this spontaneity or facility for "enjoying life"
as one of the more noticeable. characteristics of the people he would consider
to be most completely alive.

Closer to the conciliar documents than Snygg

and Combs, he observes this quality in diverse areas of the lives of his
subjects.
He notices it first in their own sense of dignity and worth.

These

people, he claims, seem to be "fulfilling-eli.emselves and to be doing the
best they are capable of doing;" they "have .•. developed" or "are developing"
to their "full stature." (Maslow, 1954, p. 201}_~

For this ':'development and

-continued growth," he explains, they are dependent not so much on the world

and people outside tfiem as on the "potentialities and latent resources"

·
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within them (p. 2141.

That does not mean, however, that they customarily

turn away from the world and introspectively turn in on themselves;
characteristically, they are "strongly focused" in the opposite direction,
'

on "some mission in life, some task to fulfill, some problem outside themselves."

As Maslow puts it, they are "problem centred rather than ego-

centred" (p. 211).
Notwithstanding this outward orientation in their lives, these people
seem to be in extraordinarily close touch with their own feelings.
remarks upon this as a second distinguishing characteristic.
he asserts that the one implies the other.

Maslow

In fact,

"Their (these people's) ease

~

of penetration to reality" implies, he believes, "a superior awareness of
their oW-U ... subjective reacitons in general" (p. 210).

This awareness, he

claims, can at times be "so pleasant or even ecstatic" that it would seem
"almost sacrilegious" to cut it off; at other times it can be experienced
with such tremendous intensification, absorption in the task or experience,
and transcendence of self as to merit the title of what Maslow calls a
"mystic experience" (p. 217).

Another and perhaps more common version. of

this sort of experience is what he describes as the "waderful capacity to
appreciate again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life,
with awe, pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy" (p. 215).
At the opposite end-of the scale from these so-called mystic experiences
is a third characteristic of this sort of fulfillment in life.
person's basic acceptance of .reality as it is.

This is the

The "philosophic acceptance

of the nature of his self, of human nature, of much of social life, and
of nature and physical reality" is, in Maslow' s view, the very foundation
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What he approves or disapproves of, what

he is loyal to or opposes, what pleases or displeases him can, Maslow claims,
"often be understood as surface derivations of this source trait of
acceptance" (p. 230).
Rogers, like Maslow, seems to be searching for a higher order variable
to explain the characteristic the conciliar documents have been designating
as fulfillment.

The nearest he comes to it is describing a set of subjective

feelings which, though not fulfillment, may accompany it.

Eschewing feelings

like pleasure, joy, satisfaction, he fastens on a set which he describes by
words like "enriching, exciting, rewarding, challenging, meaningful" (Rogers,
1961, p. 1861.

But even these terms, he says, can be misleading:

they are

~

too static, suggesting that the person has already arrived at or achieved
this condition of excitment or meaningfulness.

To Rogers, this condition

is not so much a state of being as a process:

in this respect the person

is continually changing (Rogers, 1959, p. 2351.
In the process certain things happen to him.

But again Rogers describes

these things only at the level of subjective feeling--that is, not the
characteristic itself but

the subjective awareness ("experience," as he

terms it .1961, p. 195]) ~-which still fails to describe adequately the
fulfillment spoken of by the conciliar documents.
He speaks, for example, of a fuller and more immediate awareness of
self.

This implies for Rogers a "wider range of" (1961, p. 195} and an

"increasing openness to" experience (p. 189) than that afforded by a more
constricting or less fulfilling way of living.

Entering more fully into this.

process means getting involved in what Rogers describ.es as the "frequently

-73frightening and frequently satisfying experience of a more sensitive living,
with greater range, greater variety, greater richness" (p. 195).

In practice

this would mean living more intimately with and more sensitively aware of one'i::
'

feelings of pain, anger, fear, courage, love, joy; a growing readiness to
expose oneself to these

feelings, to place oneself in jeopardy almost in

order to discover and express more of oneself in the process.
Putting this differently, Rogers describes it as an increasing tendency
to live more fully in each moment.

In his terms living in the moment means

an absence of "rigidity," of "tight organization," of the "imposition of
structure on experience."

It means instead a "maximum of adaptability,"
~

a discovery of "structure in experience," a "flowing, changing organization
of self and peJS)nality" (l961, p. 189).

Or, to put it another way altogether,

it means becoming a "participant in the ongoing process of organismic
experience," as Rogers phrases it, rather than being outside of it as an
observer or "in control of it."

For this is a special additional quality

is required.
This is a certain confidence in oneself as a trustworthy instrument for
facing up to life.

This is the third characteristic.

Living in the moment,

in the sense implied above, involves a certain readiness to risk, which,
unless one is to expose himself to the charge of rashness, demands a greater
trust in one's own organism, in its capacity to experience and to perceive
reliably and its capacity to direct.

Given this

~rust,

the criterion of what

is the good and the appropriate thing to do is simJ21Y that "it feels right."
Responding thus in a certain way or doing a certain thing for the sufficient
and good reason that "it feels right" will prove in the end, according to

-74Rogers, a "component and trustworthy guide to behavior which is truly
satisfying" (1961, p. 189).

/

-75CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND APPLICATION
This essay has a twofold objective.

In view of the tremendous

importance attached to the human person in the documents of Vatican Council
II it sought first to develop some notion of the human person as described
in the documents.

Then, in view of the importance accorded to the contribu-

tions of the social sciences by the documents and their own claim that
they themselves had been so open to those sciences, the essay sought
secondly to compare this notion with those of four contemporary American
psychologists.
An outline of the whole work is sketched out in Chapter 2.

The picture

of the human person is briefly presented in the.first part of the chapter
(see Table l); the parallel pictures presented by the contemporary
psychologists in the second part (see Table 2}.

Each dimension of the

original conciliar picture is elaborated in the subsequent chapters (Chapters
3-7} and then compared or contrasted with the picture presented by the
psychologists.

These comparisons are summarized in tabular form in Tables

3-7.
This presentation of the human person gives rise to two questions.
One refers to the worth of such a presentation or the practical uses to
which it can be put; the other, to the necessity of a more critical evaluatio
of the two pictures of the human person.
The latter can be considered first.

Given/the claim of the conciliar

documents (supra, Chapter 2) that they are "scrutinizing the signs of the
times" and that they are responding in "language intelligible to each

r
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it was to be expected that there would be many similarities between the
picture of the human person presented in the documents and that presented
by the contemporary psychologists.
been pointed out.

These similarities, it is believed, have

But there are also differences.

Some of these are obvious

and have already been touched upon; others are perhaps less obvious and need
to be resumed here.
On the nature of man, for instance, the documents are explicit,
particularly The Church in the Modern World (GS, 11-15, 24-32).

But the

same explicitness is missing from the writings of the psychologists.
Understandably, it may not be their intention to treat this question; in
many instances, however, there are implicit assumptions which reveal their
position.

Snygg and Combs, as has been pointed out (supra, Chapters 3-4),

have removed from their later writings the more explicit statements on
determinism and free will that were found in their earlier work; but certain
implicit assumptions (of determinism} still linger in parts (cf. pp. 17, 310).
In Rogers, too, as has been indicated, there lurks a certain trace either of
angelism or of a Rousseau-like conception of the nature of man.
of these differ.ences are discernible in many ways.

Implications

The conciliar. concept of

responsibility, for example, with its emphasis on the inalienable
responsibility of the human person for his own decisions and actions, goes
much further than the pleas of some of the psychologists to trust the
"rationality" of the organism.

Likewise in the category of interpe:rsonal

relations, the .conciliar concept goes beyond that-of the psychologists.

It

emphasizes go~ls of these relations, which extend far beyond the immediate
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pleasure of the person concerned.

In the category of fulfillment the gap

between the two concepts is more pronounced.

The description.of this ful-

fillment in terms of "rich," "exciting," "spontaneous" subjective feelings,
as presented by the psychologists, does not carry the weight of the sober,
objective description given in the documents.
spontanei'ty:

Likewise with the concept of

as it is described by the psychologists, it is at times quite

comparable with the rigid determinism of the brute (cf. Gasson, 1954, p. 167);
on that account it falls short of the description of human fulfillment found
in the documents.
There are differences still.

One is the tendency on the part of some

of the psychologists to substitute metaphor for reality.

Metaphorical

expressions like the "flowing, changing organizations of personality" and
figurative language like the breaking with "tradition and orthodoxy"
leave the impression of a certain vagueness.

A second difference is the

tendency, of Maslow especially, to write at times as if, instead of reporting
objective observations, he were merely expressing wishes.

Statements like

rising to one's "full stature" and maintaining a "certain inner detachment
from the culture in which" and is "immersed" have a certain exhortatory or
rhetorical ring.

Some of these differences, it' is true, tend to be

exaggerated by the way in which citations from the psychologists have been
made.

Whilst it is true that the method of quoting their exact words and

short expressions preserves a certain flavor of verisimilitude and authentic-·
ity, it introduces at the same time a certain artificiality.

Aptness ?r

/

felicity of phrase is no substitute for substance or depth of thought, yet
the very methodology used in this essay has tended to favor the former over

-78the latter.
Leaving aside this critical evaluation, let us return to the earlier
question--the practical uses to whfch the concept of the human person as
presented here can be put. ' The main ones suggest themselves.
The first is that it could be used as a pattern or goal of the human
person towards which those responsible for the education or formation of
young people might work.

The second is that it could also serve as an

heuristic concept which could well be utilized as an analytic instrument for
the interpretation and understanding of much of the unrest,

di~satisfaction,

longing and groping for answers that is to be found in institutional life.
today, especially within the Church.

Each of these uses merit further

elaboration.
First, the conciliar picture as a pattern of the human person.

This

pattern of the human person would, it seems, enter into most consideration
of education, personal growth and development, religious formation, and
administration:
1)

Education.

The picture could be of use to parents and those

engaged in the education of young peopie.

It could serve as a

pattern or guide for the sort of person they are trying to
educate.
2)

Personal Development.

The picture could likewise serve as a

guide for those interested in their own development as they
live and develop within the existing institutional structures.
3)

Religious formation.

The picture is, it seems, of particular

relevance to those responsible for the formation of religious.

Without some such model of the human person an adequate understanding
of a life of consecration under vows would seem very difficult to
come by.
4)

Administration.

The picture is also relevant to the administrator--

educational, religious, ecclesiastical, civil, or any other where
human persons are concerned.

This follows from the objective of

administration wich, according to well established practice in this
country, is making all the human and material resources of the
organization available and effective.

A moment's reflection will

produce abundant evidence of the failure in many instances to make
the best use of the human resources available.

The "drop-outs"

from school and the religious life, the underachievers in school
and the "non-producers" in industry, and the thousands who live
impoverished, stunted, soured and embittered lives as a result will
indicate the losses entailed for the individuals themselves, for
religious orders, for the Church, and for society at large.
Second, the use of the picture as an heuristic concept.

The unrest and

dissatisfaction experienced in organizational life generally has been a
subject of interest in recent years; but few have been able to bring any
critical understanding to the phenomenon.

So too with the longing, alienation,

frustration and groping expressed in the writings and words of the more
articulate and in the pained looks of those less so--in educational, industria ,
religious, ecclesiastical, and civil institution~! life.

Much of this has

been either misinterpreted and mis-labelled indifference, defiance, rebellion;
or just simply misunderstood and ignored--all because of the lack of a

-80sufficiently reliable analytical instrument with which to
data.

int~rpret

the

To meet this need the heuristic concept (see the grid in Table 2)

might be adapted as a guide for rendering the data intelligible and then,

.

as a start at least, for facilitating or procuring the suitable remedies.

'
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ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR VATICAN DOCUMENTS
(Decree~

the Apostolate of the Laity, 1965).

AA

Apostolicam Actuositatem

DH

Dignitatis Humanae (Declaration on Religious Freedom, 1965)

GS

Gaudium et Spes (Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern
World, 1965)

IM

Inter Mirif ica (Decree on the Instruments of Social Communication, 1963)

LG

Lumen Gentium (Dogmatic Constitution of the Church, 1964)

OT

Optatam Totius (Decree on Priestly Formation, 1965)

.PC

Perfectae Caritatis (Decree

.Q!!.

the Appropriate Renewal of the Religious

Life, 1965)
PO

Presbyterorum Ordinis (Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests, 1965)

PP

Progressio Populorum (The Progress of the Peoples, 1967)

UR

Unitatis Redintegratio (Decree on Ecumenism, 1964)
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